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Data on 778 establishments indicates that firms in Kenya rely on technologies such as computers, 
generators, and cell-phones to conduct operations when regulations, infrastructure, security, workforce, 
corruption, and finance pose significant hurdles in the business environment.  Obstacles related to 
regulations, security, and workforce, increase the probability of technology ownership, whereas obstacles 
related to infrastructure in particular, reduces the probability that firms own technology.  Results indicate 
that while all firms rely on technology in the face of regulatory and other obstacles, those with female 
principal owners experience net effects that are statistically distinct from those experienced by their 
counterparts.  A gender-of-owner disaggregated Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition of differences in 
technology ownership indicates that up to 18% of the total gap is unexplained by differences in 
measurable characteristics between firms that are female-owned and those that are not, suggesting that 
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Section I:  Introduction 
It is well-recognized that firms in Africa face large operation costs due to regulatory obstacles to 
business operations and inadequate infrastructure capabilities.  These capabilities include direct measures 
such as access to telephone land-lines, electricity and water connections, as well as indirect measures such 
as secure, uncorrupt environments within which to engage in every-day activities, or the availability of 
adequate finance and an educated, skilled workforce.  When hurdles of this nature exist, firms may rely 
on technology to overcome many of the difficulties faced.  For example, if there are significant delays in 
obtaining mainline telephone connections, firms may opt to rely on technologies such as cell-phones and 
computers to conduct business, and use email and the internet for communication and advertisement 
purposes.  When the supply of electricity is unreliable, firms may invest in generators to overcome the 
problem.  Furthermore, if crime is rampant, firms may have to pay for security and security equipment to 
protect their businesses.  These examples indicate that the use of technologies such as cell-phones, 
computers, generators, may be endogenous to regulatory obstacles, poor infrastructure, and an insecure 
business environment.  This is the main hypothesis that is tested in this analysis. 
  In dealing with the constraints presented by excessive regulation and lack of infrastructure and 
services, it may be argued that firms owned by women are at an even greater disadvantage.  This is 
because women-owned businesses tend to be more credit-constrained that those run by men.  Moreover, 
unlike firms operated by men, women-owned businesses are often isolated from formal and informal 
networks that provide information and support.  Women-run businesses also tend to be more small-scale.  
For these reasons, giving gifts or making informal payments to expedite licenses for telephone land-lines 
or electricity connections, pose a greater hardship for them.  Since women-owned firms face higher 
implicit and explicit costs of operation, intuitively, one would expect different patterns in their reliance on 
technology such as computers, cell-phones, and generators, as compared to businesses owned by men 
only.  This is a secondary hypothesis tested in this analysis, and the aim of our study is to shed light on 
these hypotheses using data on firms from Kenya. 2 
 
  Kenya constitutes an interesting environment to study the dependence on technology use by men-
owned and women-owned businesses.  Like other African countries, Kenyan infrastructure is poorly 
developed and firms face a plethora of regulatory obstacles related to business and licensing permits, 
access to land, telecommunications, zoning restrictions, and regulations on pricing and hours of operation.  
However, unlike other African countries, a sizeable proportion of firms list one or more women as 
principle owners.  Furthermore, as is well known, cell-phone usage is widespread in the country (Aker 
and Mbiti, 2010).  Using the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey data on Kenyan manufacturing firms, retail 
firms, Information and Technology (IT) firms, and micro-enterprises, this study descriptively analyzes 
whether businesses in general, and particularly those that list a woman as one of the principle owners, rely 
on technologies such as cell-phones, computers, and generators to circumvent problems arising from 
inadequately developed infrastructure, an insecure corrupt environment, and excessively stringent laws.   
Conditioning on covariates such as regional indicators, firm and industry characteristics which 
include age of the enterprise, number of permanent and temporary workers, and value of property and 
machinery, as well as characteristics of the top manager including educational level and experience, this 
study shows that conditional on obstacles to business, firms in Kenya are more likely to own 
communication and other technologies such as those noted above.  In particular, the probability of 
technology ownership is 0.07 higher for all firms in the full sample, and 0.01 higher for firms in industries 
with low barriers to entry for women, if regulations are a moderate, major, or very severe constraint.  
Although all firms rely on technology when obstacles to business operations are present, we find that 
Kenyan firms with female ownership exhibit statistically different trends as compared to their male-only 
owned counterparts.  In particular, conditional on firm, industry, and top manager characteristics, the 
probability of owning a computer, generator, or cell-phone, increases by 0.15 in the full sample of 
industries if the firm has one or more female principal owners.  Tests for the joint significance of the 
interactions of female-owned firm indicator variable with different obstacle categories emphasize that 
differential patterns exist in the manner in which female-owned firms react to regulatory hurdles in the 
manufacturing, retail, and service sectors of Kenya.   3 
 
In order to explain the distinct pattern in the reliance on technology by female-owned firms, we 
implement an Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition procedure.  Results from this decomposition show that 
up to 18% of the total observed gap in use of technology between firms with female owners and those 
without is unexplained by differences in measurable characteristics.  Hence there is some indication that 
female-owned firms rely relatively more on technology, conditional on firm, industry, and top manager 
characteristics, as compared to firms that are only male-owned.  This behavior is interpreted as being 
reflective of the widespread understanding in developing countries that female-owned firms are more 
vulnerable than their male-owned counterparts.   
Section 2: Literature Review 
  Existing studies of the influence of regulatory obstacles on technology adoption have mainly 
focused on developed countries and have been theoretical in nature.  For example, Acemoglu and Autor 
(2010) argue for changes in the standard model for studying skills and trends in earnings inequality in 
order to account for the fact that there has been an increase in the use of technologies to substitute capital 
for low-skilled labor in the United States and other developed countries, and thus, the evolution of 
technology should be treated endogenously.  Alesina and Zeira (2009) note that stringent labor market 
policies may be responsible for the relative increased reliance on machines to complete low skilled jobs in 
Europe, as compared to the United States.  Acemoglu et al. (2007) models technology adoption 
endogenously particularly when regulations govern relations between a firm and its suppliers.   
In terms of the developing world, most studies have concentrated on the adverse economic 
impacts of restrictive labor legislations.  These studies that note the negative relationship between labor 
regulations and economic impacts include Almeida and Carneiro (2009), which finds that stricter labor 
laws restrict firm size and the use of informal labor in Brazil.  Using data from India, Lall and Mengistae 
(2005) find that labor laws combined with power shortages are significant determinants of city-level 
productivity differences.  Menon and Sanyal (2005) notes that Indian states with “pro-worker” laws are 
less likely to attract new domestic investment or new foreign direct investment (Menon and Sanyal, 
2007).   Finally, Besley and Burgess (2004) finds that restrictive labor laws in India are correlated with 4 
 
reductions in employment and productivity, particularly in the registered manufacturing sector.  These 
studies mainly focus on the negative economic consequences of labor regulations (only).  None consider 
that technology adoption decisions may be endogenous in environments where regulations exist. 
The exception that has noted and tested for the endogeneity of technology adoption in developing 
countries is Amin (2009).  This study uses enterprise-level data from India and finds that retail stores 
respond to the cost of stricter labor laws by substituting away from workers to computers.  Hence labor 
regulations and technology are endogenous, so that when labor regulations are more stringent, retail stores 
are more likely to own a computer. This firm behavior reduces dependence on additional workers, which 
may be expensive when states enforce a host of wage and hour laws and other regulations on working 
conditions.  However, the focus of this study is labor laws only - even though there are robustness checks 
with respect to some of the other obstacles that a firm may face, these hinge on the assumption that the 
non-labor obstacles are negatively correlated with computer usage.  As we show below, this assumption 
need not hold.  Moreover, Amin (2009) treats ownership of a generator and financial indicators for the 
firm (whether firms have a checking or savings account, or an overdraft facility) as exogenous, when this 
is unlikely to be the case.  In particular, firms are more likely to own generators when they report that 
availability of electricity is an obstacle to every-day operations, and state-level laws governing employer-
employee relations are likely to be correlated with the ease with which firms obtain lines of credit and 
overdraft facilities. 
This research contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, it considers all the obstacles that 
a firm reports as being impediments to every-day operations, not those related to labor regulations alone.  
That this is important for obtaining unbiased estimates is clear from a simple correlation exercise which 
indicates that many of the regulatory and infrastructural obstacles in a firm’s business environment are 
correlated at the 95% or higher level.
1  Second, it considers three different forms of technology that may 
respond to the stringency of regulations and dearth of infrastructure that exist in a firm’s business 
environment – computers, generators, and cell-phones.  Third, it disaggregates technology adoption 
effects by gender-of-owner, and shows that firms that have female principal owners respond to obstacles 5 
 
in statistically significant ways that are different as compared to their counterparts.  Finally, to the best of 
our knowledge, it is the first to document the endogeneity of technology adoption in the face of regulatory 
and other business obstacles in Africa.  
Section 3:  Business Environment 
  We begin our analysis by describing the business landscape in Kenya.  Table 1 provides a snap-
shot of some of the measures constructed by the World Bank using the Enterprise Survey Data for Kenya 
from 2007.  In general, Kenya is a difficult business climate given a variety of regulatory, corruption, 
crime, and infrastructure-related problems.  Among regulatory, corruption, and crime-related indicators, 
Kenya is worse than the regional average in the number of days required to obtain an import license, the 
percent of firms indentifying tax rates and tax administration as a major constraint, and the percent of 
firms identifying business licensing and permits as a major constraint.  At 79%, the proportion of firms 
expected to make informal payments to public officials is more than twice the average for other countries 
in the same region of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Corruption appears to be major problem in public dealings as 
well as seen by the fact that up to 71% of firms are expected to give gifts in order to secure a government 
contract, which is again, close to twice the regional average.  About one third of all firms identify crime, 
theft, and disorder as a major obstacle in Kenya.     
  In terms of infrastructure-related constraints, although Kenya ranks more favorably than the 
regional average in terms of the number of power outages in a typical month, the proportion of sales lost 
due to such outages is slightly higher than the regional average proportion.  Moreover, although the 
number of days required in order to obtain a water connection or a mainline telephone connection in 
Kenya is marginally fewer than the mean number of days for other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
number of days required to obtain an electrical connection in Kenya is almost 10 days more as compared 
to the regional average. 
  The finance indicators show that Kenya compares more favorably than the regional average in 
terms of the proportion of firms with credit from financial institutions, and the value of collateral required 
for a loan.  However, such averages mask important differences in access to finance as is clear from 6 
 
International Finance Corporation (2006).  This report shows that women entrepreneurs consider access to 
finance as one of the biggest obstacles they face.  The lack of adequate finance arises primarily from the 
fact that women have unequal access to land and property in Kenya, and are thus unable to provide 
collateral in order to secure loans from formal institutions.  This restricted access to credit has several 
consequences including the fact that women-owned businesses are often unable to expand and are 
compelled to remain at a microenterprise level.     
Finally, the trade-related indicators in Table 1 shows that the percent of firms that trade which 
identify customs and trade regulations as a major constraint is about 4% higher than the regional average.  
Although this is already unfavorable, there are further differences that disproportionately affect women-
owned firms in Kenya.  Women entrepreneurs in Kenya are one and half times more likely to cite 
customs and trade regulations as a barrier as compared to male entrepreneurs (World Bank, 2006). 
  The regulatory, corruption, crime, infrastructure, finance and trade-related indicators discussed 
above show that in general, the business ethos in Kenya is more difficult as compared to other countries 
in the region.  In such an environment, it is logical to hypothesize that firms will rely on technologies 
such as computers, cell-phones and generators, to overcome the costs imposed by constrictive regulations 
and poor infrastructure.  Given their small size, restricted access to finance, and relative isolation from 
business networks, firms with female owners should be expected to rely on such technologies to an even 
greater extent as compared to firms with only male owners.  We test for these patterns below.      
Section 4:  Data and descriptive statistics 
Data used in this research are from the Enterprise Survey which was implemented by the World 
Bank in Kenya in 2007.  The Enterprise Survey is a firm-level survey which is representative of a 
country’s private sector economy.
2  In Kenya, the firms that were targeted were located in the capital city 
of Nairobi which is in the central part of the country, the coastal city of Mombasa, Nakuru in the Rift 
Valley, and Kisumu which is located near Lake Victoria in the Western region of the country (see Map).  
Establishments in all manufacturing sectors, construction, retail and wholesale services, hotels and 
restaurants, transport, storage, and communications, and computer and related activities were 7 
 
administered the survey.  Those that had five or more full-time permanent paid employees were stratified 
into five groups: manufacturing (food and beverages), manufacturing (garment), manufacturing (other), 
retail trade, and “rest of the universe” (RoU) which included construction, wholesale trade, hotels, bars 
and restaurants, transportation, storage, and communications, and computer related activities.  Firms 
having fewer than five full-time permanent paid employees (“micro establishments”) were also sampled; 
however, these were not stratified according to industry.  The data contain 466 firms from Nairobi, 107 
firms from Mombasa, 102 firms from Nakuru, and 106 firms from Kisumu, for a total of 781 firms.  Of 
these, 657 firms employ five or more full-time permanent paid employees and 124 are micro 
establishments. 
 The Enterprise Survey asks detailed questions on the environment faced by firms in conducting 
business within their region of operation.  These questions include those related to firm characteristics, 
gender participation, sales, costs of inputs, workforce composition, bribery payments made, and obstacles 
related to telecommunications, crime, licensing, infrastructure, trade, competition, land and permits, 
taxation, access to finance, zoning restrictions, and other restrictions on hours of operation and pricing 
and mark-ups.  Given the sensitive nature of some of the questions, the World Bank contracted with 
private organizations within the country to conduct the survey.  Questions are asked of owners and top 
managers, although sometimes company accountants and human resource managers are called into the 
interview, particularly to answer questions on sales and labor-related aspects of the questionnaire.  Given 
the level of detail in the survey, these data are particularly relevant for purposes of this study. 
The sampling methodology employed is stratified random sampling with replacement, where the 
strata are firm size (number of employees), business sector (manufacturing, retail, and other services), and 
geographic region within the country.  Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, and Kisumu were selected since they 
collectively contain the largest share of economic activity in Kenya.  All estimations as well as summary 
statistics are adjusted with sampling weights provided in the data to account for the differing probabilities 
of selection across the various strata.  We obtain population estimates by applying the sampling weights 
to individual firm-level observations. 8 
 
  Among the total universe of 781 firms, 778 report information on whether any of the principal 
owners is female.  In these data, 286 firms (36.76%) have one or more female principal owners.  The 
largest proportion of firms with female principal owners is located in manufacturing garment industries 
(52.17%), followed by retail industries (43.48%) and manufacturing food industries (38.94%).  That firms 
with female principal owners are relatively high in manufacturing garment and retail industries is fairly 
typical of most developing countries in Africa and Asia.  Figure 1 depicts the percentage of firms with 
female principal owners and those without, by number of employees (firm size).  The figure is arranged 
such that classifications that have the largest difference between female-owned and male-owned firms 
appear first.  Firms are denoted as “small” if they employ 5-19 full-time permanent paid workers, 
“medium” if they employ 20-99 full-time permanent paid workers and “large” if they employ 100 or more 
full-time permanent paid workers.
3  As discussed above “micro” firms have fewer than 5 full-time 
permanent paid workers.  From Figure 1 it is clear that firms with female principal owners dominate those 
with only male owners among the small and micro categories.  About 44% of firms with female principal 
owners are small firms, and about 17% of them are micro firms.  Although their presence is still sizeable 
among medium and large firms, they do not exceed the proportion of male-owned firms within these 
groupings.   
Figure 2 shows the percentage of firms with female principal owners and without, by detailed 
industrial classification.  Again, the figure is arranged to depict the industries with the largest gender-of-
owner differences (female-owned – male-owned) first.  Firms with female headship are especially high in 
manufacturing industries that include garments (17%), food (15%), and textiles (5%), in retail industries 
(25%), and in other industries such as hotels and restaurants (9%) and construction and transport (3%).  
Figure 2 also reveals that firms with female headship exceed those with male-only headship in 
manufacturing non-metallic minerals.  These non-metallic minerals include gemstones and gold, which is 
mainly processed by small-scale artisanal workers in the Western and South-Western regions of the 
country near Lake Victoria. 9 
 
   Figure 3 is a disaggregation of ownership by gender and legal status, and follows the pattern in 
the figures above by showing those classifications with the largest gap between female and male headship 
first.  Firms are classified as “public” if shares are traded publicly in the stock market.  If shares are not 
traded or traded only privately, the firm is categorized as “private”.  “Sole proprietorships” and 
“partnerships” are classes in which ownership participation is not on the basis of shares.  More 
specifically, sole proprietorships are businesses that are owned and managed by an individual, whereas 
partnerships are firms in which two or more parties share profits and liabilities.  The main characteristic 
of this classification is that each partner has unlimited liability.  The “other” category includes some 
combination of the above four groups, for example, cooperatives or mixed ownership.  From Figure 4, it 
is evident that firms with female ownership exceed those with male ownership among establishments that 
are registered partnerships, in the other grouping, and, surprisingly, among firms that are legally classified 
as public.  About 21% of firms with female owners are partnerships, 1% is other firms, and another 1% is 
public firms.  The finding that firms with female ownership exceed those with male-only ownership in the 
public category may reflect the implicit widely held belief that politically connected male owners find it 
beneficial to include women (often wives) as owners in order to avail of tax and other financial benefits 
(for example, the “Mwamba” loans that are provided to large businesses for acquiring machinery and 
other assets by the Kenya Women’s Finance Trust (KWFT), Ltd. can be accessed only by women 
business owners).  Figure 4 also shows that firms with female owners are present among sole 
proprietorships (36%) and private firms (41%); however, their proportions are smaller compared to male-
owned firms within these categories. 
Finally, figure 4 shows the breakdown of firms by gender-of-owner and use of technology.  The 
technologies considered are computer (the firm uses email or has its own web-site or has an internet 
connection), generator (the firm owns or shares a generator), and cell-phone (the firm uses cell-phones for 
communication with clients and suppliers).  As noted above, about one-third of firms in these data have 
one or more female principal owners.  In such an environment, it is remarkable to note that firms with 
female owners rely on computers and cell-phones to such a disproportionately large extent.  Figure 4 10 
 
reports that the percentage of cell-phone ownership by female-owned firms exceeds that of male-owned 
firms.  Approximately 17% of female owned firms use cell-phones compared to about 15 percent of male 
firms.  49% of female-owned firms rely on computers as compared to 53% of male-owned firms, and the 
difference between these categories of firms in generator ownership is larger (27% of female-owned firms 
versus 36% of male-owned firms).  The “technology” denoted bars in Figure 4 report the gender 
disaggregated ownership pattern for computer, generator, and cell-phone combined.  It is clear that in 
terms of usage of these three technologies, the share of firms with female headship is about 68% and the 
share of firms with male headship is 72%.  The patterns in Figure 4 indicate that in comparison to their 
share in the total population of firms in Kenya, female-owned firms depend on computers, cell-phones, 
and generators to a relatively high extent as compared to firms with only male-owners. 
Figures 1 – 4 provide a graphical description of characteristics of firms with female principal 
owners in Kenya.  Such firms are primarily small with 5-19 full-time permanent paid employees, are 
mainly present in manufacturing garment and retail industries, are primarily partnerships and cooperatives 
or classified as mixed ownerships in the other category, and rely on computers and cell-phones to a larger 
degree than indicated by their presence in the total population of Kenyan firms.  Next, we focus on the 
obstacles perceived by firms in the business environment of Kenya. 
The data report constraints related to twenty different types of obstacles.  For expositional 
purposes, the twenty separate types of constraints reported by firms are combined into six categories of 
obstacles – regulations, infrastructure, security, workforce, corruption, and finance.  The regulations 
group includes the following obstacles: labor regulations, licensing and permits, customs and trade 
regulations, regulations on hours of operation, regulations on pricing and mark-ups, zoning restrictions, 
tax rates, and tax administration.  The infrastructure group includes obstacles related to 
telecommunications, electricity, transportation, and access to land.  The security category includes 
constraints related to crime, theft, and disorder, political instability, macroeconomic instability, and 
functioning of the courts.  The workforce group includes obstacles related to an inadequately educated 11 
 
workforce, and the corruption group includes obstacles related to corruption and practices of competitors 
in the informal sector.  The last group (finance) includes obstacles related to access to finance. 
Tables 2A – 2D report unweighted numbers of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, 
or very severe, by firm size, industry, and technology use.  In these data, firms are asked to rank obstacles 
on a scale of five – no obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate obstacle, major obstacle, and very severe 
obstacle.  The tables that follow report results for firms that describe constraints to be moderate, major, or 
very severe.  It is clear from the total counts in Table 2A that the vast majority of firms report regulations, 
infrastructure, corruption, and security to be moderate, major, or very severe obstacles, in that order.  For 
firms with female owners, the largest hurdles appear to be regulations, corruption, infrastructure and 
security.  This ranking is about the same for firms with male owners only, except for the switch in places 
between corruption and infrastructure.  Among the six categories of business obstacles, having an 
inadequately educated workforce appears to be the least constraining for firms in Kenya, although this 
obstacle still has significant effects on technology ownership as shown below. 
Table 2B, which reports a breakdown by firm size of the total numbers in Table 2A, reveals that 
stringent regulations continues to dominate as a moderate, major, or very severe restriction across both 
female-owned and male-owned firms.  Corruption is an important problem for small firms and access to 
finance is relatively more difficult for micro firms.  Table 2C shows patterns by industry, and regulations 
continues to be cited as the most binding constraint across manufacturing, retail, information and 
technology, construction and transport, and hotels and restaurant industries.  Lastly, Table 2D reports 
unweighted counts of obstacles disaggregated by types of technology.  In general, firms reporting 
regulations to be a moderate, major, or very severe constraint are also likely to use email or own a web-
site or have an internet connection, use cell-phones to communicate with clients and suppliers, and own or 
share a generator.  This pattern holds true even when firms are differentiated by gender-of-principal 
owner in this table. 
Tables 3A – 3D shows weighted proportions of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, 
major, or very severe, by firm size, industry, and technology use.  Many of the trends noted above appear 12 
 
to hold across these tables as well – the one big difference is that access to finance now appears to be a 
bigger obstacle than was previously evident.  Indeed, Table 3A shows that 94.2% of firms report access to 
finance to be a binding constraint, which is just short of the 99.9% who report regulations to be moderate, 
major, or a very severe hurdle.  Furthermore, estimates in Table 3B reveal that for firms with female 
owners, access to finance is a relatively steep obstacle for micro and small firms but less so for medium 
and large firms.  Finally, security is a relatively larger concern for medium and large firms across both 
female-owned and male-owned firms. 
Table 3C shows weighted proportions by industrial groupings and for firms with female headship, 
regulations continue to be the most widely cited obstacle in five of the six industrial categories.  Firms 
with female owners in the construction and transport sector appear to be particularly susceptible to all 
obstacles considered – the proportion of such firms reporting five of the six constraints to be moderate, 
major, or very severe uniformly exceeds 97%.  This does not appear the case for this industrial sub-group 
among firms with male owners.  Amongst firms with male-ownership, access to finance is in general the 
most widely cited obstacle after regulations.  Finally, estimates in Table 3D show that firms who report 
using email or own a website or have an internet connection are also more likely to report regulations, 
security, and infrastructure to be binding obstacles.  This is mostly true for cell-phone usage and generator 
ownership as well, and is still evident when data are disaggregated by gender-of-firm owner. 
Tables 2A – 3D provide descriptive evidence that firms perceive excessive regulations, poor 
infrastructure, lack of security, and widespread corruption as imposing significant burdens in the business 
environment of Kenya.  There are also correlations evident between the perception of these constraints 
and use of email or own web-sites, cell-phones, and generators.  Next, we place structure on these 
correlations by estimating simple non-linear models that measure the effect of constraints on technology 
ownership. 
Section 5:  Business Obstacles and Technology Use 
We begin this section by reporting differences in obstacles and other firm level variables between 
female-headed and male-only headed firms.  As noted above, obstacles are coded to represent moderate, 13 
 
major, or very severe constraints.  Furthermore, obstacles measured in the data reflect a firm’s perceptions 
of its operating environment.  In order to eliminate possible measurement errors and other endogeneity 
issues that may contaminate these variables, we take averages of these variables at the region, industry, 
legal status, and firm size level (Angrist and Krueger 2001).  The estimations discussed in the following 
tables are conducted on constructed mean values of the obstacles rather than an individual firm’s 
perceptions of them.
4  
Table 4 provides weighted descriptive statistics on the characteristics of firms with female owners 
and those without, and an indication of whether there is a statistical difference in these characteristics.  
The characteristics reported include ownership of technology (computer, generator, or cell-phone, where 
establishments are coded as owning a computer if they use email, or have their own web-site, or have an 
internet connection), obstacles related to regulations, infrastructure, security, workforce, corruption, and 
finance, regional indicators, firm and industry characteristics including firm size, value of property and 
machinery, legal status, industrial classification, and whether payments were made for security or for 
protection or to the police, and finally, characteristics of the firm’s top manager including whether she/he 
has an advanced degree, and her/his number of years of experience in the sector.  Estimates in this table 
indicate that on average, firms with at least one female among principal owners have slightly higher 
percentage values than firms without female owners in terms of technology ownership.
5  In particular, 
99% of female-headed firms own computers, generators, or cell-phones as compared to about 97% of 
male-owners only firms.  However, these numbers are not statistically different. 
The reported differences in obstacles for female-headed and male-only headed firms in Table 4 
shows that the weighted average percentage value is somewhat higher for female-owned firms in four of 
the six categories (infrastructure, security, workforce, and corruption); however, these differences are not 
statistically significant.  Table 4 also reports differences in obstacles that might be considered less 
subjective than those discussed above.  These are variables that measure actions that an establishment has 
actually engaged in and include variables that fall under the broad categories of corruption (payments 
made for security, protection payments, and payments made informally to the police) and access to 14 
 
finance (proportion of working capital financed from formal and informal sources).  Among these, there 
is a statistically discernible difference by gender-of-owner in payments made for protection.  Estimates 
indicate that establishments with one or more female principal owners are about 13% more likely to make 
such payments to organized crime in order to prevent violence. 
Differences in regional dummies indicates that there are relatively fewer female-headed firms in 
Nairobi, and relatively more firms with female owner in Mombasa and Nakuru - these differences are 
statistically significant.  In terms of firm and industry characteristics, although female-owned firms have 
more years of operation, slightly more full-time employees, lower property values, about the same value 
of percentage of establishment owned by largest shareholders, relatively fewer proportion of African-
origin and Lebanese or Middle Eastern or other Asian or European origin principal owners, the difference 
is measured precisely only in the case of property values.  Another instance in which there is a 
measurable difference between female and male-owned firms is in terms of manufacturing industries that 
exclude garments and food.  Results in Table 4 indicate that in other manufacturing industries such as 
chemicals, machinery and equipment, metal and metal products, firms with female principal owners are 
24% lower than firms without female principal owners.  Lastly, in terms of the top manager 
characteristics, female-owned firms have managers who are relatively better educated but with slightly 
lower experience, as compared to male-owned firms; however, these differences are not measured 
precisely. 
Results in Table 4 indicate that firms with female owners are not very different from firms with 
all-male owners in levels of technology chosen, or in terms of many of the firm, industry, and top 
manager characteristics considered.  While this lack of difference between firms with female principal 
owners and those without is re-assuring for the estimations that involve the female-owned firm indicator 
and its interactions, it also points to the possibility that the women-owned firms in the sample may not be 
representative of the average women-owned firms in the economy.  Indeed, these data are less useful to 
address questions on access to entrepreneurship as it includes a random sample of firms that have 
overcome barriers to entry and have “survived” to remain in existence.  Although this is an issue that 15 
 
plagues any data set that samples from the private sector of a developing economy, it is less problematic 
for purposes of this study since the objective is to study reliance on technology in the face of business 
constraints, conditional on a firm’s existence.  In fact, given the lack of differences between female-
owned and male-owned firms’ characteristics in Table 4, we are more confident that the measured 
difference in technology adoption in response to business obstacles does not arise solely from consistent 
differences in measurable covariates between these types of firms.  Moreover, in order to address the 
issue of comparability of results with those for the average woman-owned firms in the economy, we 
estimate our models separately for those industries in which barriers to entry for firms with female-
headship are conceivably lower.  These include manufacturing industries such as garments, food, textiles, 
and non-metallic minerals, retail industries, and service industries such as hotels and restaurants, and 
construction and transport – the industries in Figure 2 where the presence of firms with female owners 
exceeds that of firms with only-male owners.  In this sub-set of industries, there are 502 firm-level 
observations, of which 215 have female principal owners and 287 have only male principal owners.  The 
tables that follow present two sets of results – effects for firm in all industries, and separate effects for 
firms in industries with low barriers to entry for female-headed firms. 
Marginal effects for technology ownership 
  Results for technology ownership, where establishments are coded as owning technology if they 
report owning a computer, generator, or cell-phone, are reported in Table 5A.  The first column of Table 
5A shows marginal effects from a probit model that includes only obstacles to everyday operations of the 
firm.  The table reports results for the six different categories of obstacles defined above.  The second 
column shows marginal effects from a probit model that includes obstacles, and an indicator variable for 
whether the establishment has one or more female principal owners, the third column reports results for 
the variables in the second column along with the interactions of the female ownership variable with the 
different obstacle categories.  The fourth column builds on the results in the third column by adding 
regional indicators, firm and industry characteristics (firm’s age, controls for property and machinery 
value, the number of permanent and temporary employees, and industrial classification), and 16 
 
characteristics of the firm’s top manager (indicator variable for having an advanced degree and 
experience in the sector).  Regressions are weighted to be representative of the national population of 
firms using weights provided by the Enterprise Survey data for Kenya.  
 The first column of Table 5A shows that of the various categories of obstacles, regulations, 
infrastructure, workforce, and finance are significant.  Estimates indicate that if regulations are a 
moderate, major or very severe obstacle, the probability of owning technology is 0.19 higher.  Since 
regulations includes obstacles such as labor regulations, licensing and permits, regulations on hours and 
pricing as well as zoning restrictions, this is consistent with the hypothesis that technology is endogenous 
when rules and restriction are excessively binding on firms.  For labor regulations in particular, this result 
is consistent with the labor-saving function of computers, and in keeping with studies that have found that 
where labor regulations are binding, firms are more likely to invest in computers (Amin 2009).   The other 
obstacles that increase technology ownership include workforce and finance.  The fact that inadequately 
educated workforce is positively correlated with technology ownership is interesting because it indicates 
that when such regulations pose an obstacle, firms use technology to overcome this hurdle.  This 
substitution of capital (technology) for low-skilled labor (inadequately educated workforce) is broadly 
consistent with Acemoglu and Autor (2010) and Alesina and Zeira (2006).  Moreover, inadequate access 
to finance, perhaps as reflected in a restricted access to fixed capital for purposes of expansion, also 
significantly influences firms to rely on technology.  In terms of a negative effect, the obstacle that lowers 
the probability of technology ownership is infrastructure.  This is as expected since this category includes 
electricity, in the absence of which technology ownership becomes difficult. 
The second column of Table 5A shows that conditional on obstacles, firms with one or more 
female principal owners are more likely to own technologies such as computers, generators, and cell-
phones.  For such firms, the probability of technology ownership is higher by 0.02.  Column (3) of Table 
5A reports results for the interaction terms of female headship and the different obstacles in column (1).  
Note that if there were no differentiated impacts by gender of principal owners, the interactions terms 
should not be significant.  This is not the case as evident from column (3), where four of the six 17 
 
interaction terms are significant.  In particular, whereas regulations have a positive effect on technology 
ownership for all firms, those with female principal owners experience a lower 0.34 probability of owning 
technology when regulations are binding.  Estimates in column (3) indicate that for firms with female 
headship, the probability of technology ownership is only larger by 0.03 when regulations are an obstacle.  
The positive sign is consistent with our hypothesis outlined above, but the smaller relative magnitude for 
technology ownership in such firms is unexpected.  One part of the explanation may rest of the fact that 
technology requires access to finance, and female-firms are more likely to be financially constrained as 
compared to male-headed firms as noted above.   
Other interaction terms that are significant in column (3) include infrastructure and security.  The 
net effect for infrastructure indicates that the probability of technology ownership for female-owned firms 
is higher when such obstacles are binding.  Since this category subsumes telecommunications, transport, 
and access to land, this is as expected.  In particular, when access to land is a major obstacle, firms with 
female headship are on average, more likely to own technology such as computers.  This is consistent 
with the fact that where it is difficult to expand the size of the business because of such constraints, such 
firms may substitute computers for workers in order to increase work capacity without increasing physical 
work-space.  The interaction term on security is significant as well and is consistent with female firms 
relying more on computers to accomplish tasks when crime and theft is pervasive or when there is 
political instability.  Firms may overcome disruptions to business operations caused by instability by 
relying on computers to maintain day-to-day activities.  For example, if curfews are imposed to limit 
mobility during times of unrest, female-headed firms may use email and cell-phones to contact suppliers 
and other partners in business.  Moreover, results in the third column of Table 5A show that probability of 
technology ownership is lower for female-headed firms that cite corruption to be a binding constraint.  
This category includes practices of competitors in the informal sector where such practices may include 
favors that are extended to individuals in certain social networks, over and above bribes and informal 
payments that are made to expedite the purchase and sale of goods and services.  The negative coefficient 18 
 
on the corruption interaction term may indicate the relative isolation of female firms from business 
networks, if membership in social networks expedites technology ownership. 
Continuing the discussion of results in column (3) of Table 5A, the indicator variable for whether 
the establishment has one or more female principal owners is significant in this indicating that such firms 
are more likely to own computers as compared to others that have only male principal owners.  The 
estimate indicates that the probability of technology ownership is 0.82 higher for establishments that are 
female-owned.  This, along with the other gender-of-owner differentiated effects in column (3), are a 
clear indication that while all firms rely on computers to circumvent obstacles that exist in their operating 
environments, this is especially true for female-headed firms.  Effects of hurdles particular to only 
female-owned firms are also consistent with the more general observation that in developing countries, 
female-headed firms are more vulnerable as compared to their counterparts.  A test of the terms 
representing interactions of the obstacles with the indicator of female-headship indicates that the null 
hypothesis that these effects are jointly zero can be rejected; that is, these female interaction terms are 
statistically significant in the model.  
 Column (4) includes regional, firm, and top manager characteristics to the variables in column 
(3) of Table 5A.  As is clear, regulations and infrastructure continue to exert significant effects on 
technology ownership for all firms, and regulations and infrastructure continue to net effects on firms that 
are female-headed.  With the inclusion of firm and industry covariates, the indicator variable for firms 
with female principal owners decreases in magnitude.  The coefficient for this variable in column (4) 
indicates that the probability of technology ownership is 0.15 higher for firm with female-owners, 
conditional on obstacles and regional, firm, industry, and top manager characteristics.  Again, a test of the 
terms representing interactions of the obstacles with the indicator of female-headship indicates that the 
null hypothesis that these effects are jointly zero can be rejected; that is, these female interaction terms are 
statistically significant in the regression. 
Table 5B repeats the models in Table 5A for industries where barriers to entry are relatively low 
for women.  We focus our discussion on the third and fourth columns of this table since these include the 19 
 
interaction terms and the full set of regressors, and compare results with the corresponding columns of 
Table 5A.  A comparison of estimates in the third columns of Table 5A and 5B show that regulations, 
infrastructure, and finance continue to have significant effects, although the magnitude of these effects is 
somewhat lower for the first two categories of obstacles.  The interaction term on infrastructure continues 
to exert a positive but smaller effect on technology ownership, and the indicator for firms with female 
principal owners remains positive and significant, but again, is of smaller magnitude.  The joint test of 
significance on the interaction terms reported at the bottom of Table 5B continues to confirm that the 
interaction terms are not jointly zero, but the p-value is higher than in the corresponding column of Table 
5A.  A comparison of results in the fourth columns is similar to the comparison of results in the third 
columns of these two tables, except that the indicator variable loses significance and the joint test can no 
longer reject that the female-firm interaction terms are insignificant. 
The comparison of results in Tables 5A and 5B underscores the fact that some of the gender-
differentiated technology effects in the first table arise from the fact that the female-owned firms in the 
sample, although comparable to the male-owned firms, are perhaps not comparable to the average female-
firm in the economy.  However, two points are noteworthy in the results of Table 5B which contains 
female-owned firms that are representative of the larger underlying economy – first, gender-of-owner 
disaggregated effects are evident and statistically jointly significant in column (3), and second, consistent 
with the main hypothesis of this study, all firms rely more on the ownership of technologies such as 
computers, generators, and cell-phones, when regulations, infrastructure, security, and corruption, pose 
significant hurdles, and female-owned firms appear to be particularly responsive to infrastructure related 
constraints. 
  The models in Tables 5A and 5B include average measures of obstacles.  As noted above, we 
take averages in order to avoid bias that may result from measurement errors and other sources of 
endogeneity specific to a firm or the survey’s respondent (subjective responses).  An alternative method is 
to use more objective measures of obstacles – that is, actual measures of activities that the firm has had to 
engage in.  These include indicators of corruption such as whether the establishment made protection 20 
 
payments to organized crime to prevent violence, paid for security (equipment, personnel, or security 
services), or made informal payments to the police when transporting goods, and (actual) indicators of 
access to finance such as the average percent of working capital financed from formal sources (banks, 
non-bank financial institutions, and credit) and informal sources (family and moneylenders).  As 
discussed in Bardasi et al. (2007), corruption and access to finance are two obstacles in which all firms, 
especially female-owned ones, are considered to be particularly disadvantaged.  Results for technology 
ownership for these objective measures of corruption are reported in Tables 5C and 5D.  In keeping with 
the structure above, Table 5C reports results for all industries and Table 5D reports results for those 
industries with low barriers to entry for female-owned firms.   
  The first column of Table 5C shows that paying for security, making informal payments to the 
police, and the ability to finance working capital for formal and informal sources, have significant effects 
on technology ownership.  Moreover, the gender-of-owner interaction terms for measures of access to 
finance are significant and jointly different from zero.  Column (2) of Table 5C excludes the variable that 
measures payments to police as it was asked mainly for manufacturing firms.  This exclusion increases 
the number of firm level observations in column (2), and now, the indicator variable for firms with female 
principal owners is significant and shows that the probability of technology ownership is 0.01 higher for 
these firms, conditional on objective measures of corruption and access to finance obstacles.  Results for 
female-owned firms in industries with fewer barriers to entry (Table 5D) show that protection payments, 
payments to police, and ability to raise funds from informal sources are significant, and that there are 
gender of owner disaggregated effects in the case of payments to police.  The gender-of-owner 
disaggregated effects are also evident in the second column of Table 5D, particularly in terms of 
protection payments and payment for security.  Joint tests at the bottom of both columns in Table 5D 
show that the interaction terms are significantly different from zero.  Lastly, a column-by-column 
comparison of results in Tables 5C and 5D shows that effects particular to payments made to the police is 
similar in sign but smaller in magnitude, proportion of working capital financed from informal sources 21 
 
has the same sign but is larger magnitude, and interaction terms specific to variables measuring access to 
finance obstacles matter less in the smaller subset of industries.   
The results in Tables 5C and 5D are broadly consistent with those in Tables 5A and 5B in 
showing that technology ownership is responsive to business obstacles, whether the latter are measured as 
averages of subjective perceptions or as more objective measures (actions a firm has engaged in).  
Furthermore, the results in Tables 5A – 5D reveal that while all firms rely on technology to overcome 
different obstacles to current operations, those that have female principal owners experience net impacts 
that are statistically distinct from those experienced by their male-only owned counterparts.   
Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition effects for technology ownership 
  In this section of the results, we discuss the estimates reported in Tables 6A and 6B.  Table 6A 
shows average predicted probabilities for technology ownership using data from firms with female 
owners and firms without female owners, and female firm coefficients (coefficients obtained from the full 
model in column (4) of Table 5A when the data are restricted to firms with female principal owners) and 
male firm coefficients (coefficients obtained from the full model in column (4) of Table 5A when the data 
are restricted to firms with only male principal owners).  We ask two questions in order to compare the 
technology ownership behavior of these two categories of firms.  First, given the sample of firms with 
female principal owners, what would technology ownership be if it was decided in the universe of male 
firms?  This question is answered by taking the female firm sample and by predicting technology 
ownership probabilities using the male firm coefficients.  Next, the converse is done for the male firm 
sample using female firm coefficients.  This method is similar to the one employed in Barmby and Smith 
(2001).  The exercise is repeated separately for industries with low barriers to entry for women (the same 
industries as in Tables 5B and 5D), and the average predicted probabilities for all industries and the 
smaller sub-set of industries are reported in Table 6A.  
  The results in Table 6A indicate that predicted technology ownership for female firms using own 
coefficients is 0.99, while the corresponding number for male firms using own coefficients is 0.97.  
Hence, on average, female firms rely on technology to a slightly higher degree than male firms.   If the 22 
 
male firms had the same “behavior” as female firms as measured by the estimated coefficients for the 
female firms, the average probabilities for technology would be 0.99.  This probability is higher than the 
true effect (0.97) for male firms noted above, indicating again that female firms own technology to a 
somewhat greater extent.  Moreover, if the female firms had the behavior of male firms, the average 
probabilities for computer and technology would fall to 0.97.  This is lower than the true effect (0.99) 
noted above, which further underlines the fact that in comparison to male firms, female firms rely on 
technology to a slightly greater degree.  Furthermore, results in Table 6A shows that restricting the 
analysis to industries with low barriers to entry for female-owned firms reduces, but does not completely 
close the gap between true effects for firms with female owners and those without (the gap declines from 
0.015 to 0.010).  Hence, the small difference in average predicted probabilities is still evident when we 
consider female-owned firms that are representative of the average female-owned firms in the country. 
  The difference in technology ownership between female and male firms can be decomposed into 
a component which is due to differences in sample characteristics (characteristic or explained component) 
and a component which is due to differences in behavior (preference or residual component).  Such a 
decomposition is comparable to the Oaxaca-Blinder method where observed differences between two 
groups can be divided into differences in the coefficients estimated and differences in measured 
characteristics.  However, the actual Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is suitable for linear models only.  In 
this study, we implement a comparable method that can be used when the dependent variable is non-
linear (Barmby and Smith, 2001, Sayer et al., 2004, Fairlie, 2006).  The equation that underlies the 
Oaxaca-Blinder type method is: 
                                                        (1) 
Where Tmij and Tfij represent average probabilities of technology ownership in the male and female firm 
samples where the mij subscript now denotes male firms in region j and the fij subscript denotes female 
firms in region j, βm and βf are the estimated male and female coefficients discussed above, and Xmij and 
Xfij are the male and female firm samples.  The first term on the right hand side of the equation represents 
part of the total gap which is due to differences in observables (explained component) and the second 23 
 
term is the portion of the total gap that is due to differences in behavior (residual component).  As is done 
in the labor evaluation literature, results of the decomposition are estimated using male coefficients as 
weights
6.  These results are presented in Table 6B.  Again, separate results are presented in this table for 
the industries with low barriers to entry for women-owned firms. 
  The negative signs of the magnitudes of the residual component in the first panel of Table 6B 
reflects the fact that the total observed gap in technology ownership is negative (note that in the equation 
above, female values are differenced from male values).  For technology ownership in the full sample, 
124.3% of the total gap is due to the residual component attributed to unobserved factors.  In the sub-set 
of industries in the second panel of Table 6B, 17.6% of the total gap is due to unobserved factors.  
Although this large difference suggests that in the full sample of industries, firms with female principal 
owners may be more versatile with technology ownership, note that restricting the sample to 
representative female-owned firms does not drive the residual component to zero.  Estimates in the 
second panel of Table 6B still indicate that up to 18% of the gap in technology ownership between male 
and female firms remains unexplained by observed covariates.  We interpret this as evidence for the idea 
that in environments where regulations are excessive, infrastructure is inadequate, corruption is rife, and 
lack of security is pervasive, female-owned firms own technology to a greater degree than is warranted by 
their level of measured characteristics.  They thus appear to “over-compensate”, perhaps in order to 
counter-act the effects of firm-related, industry-related, or other unobservables that may be present in the 
environments in which they operate, or to which they are particularly susceptible.  This result may also 
reflect unmeasured vulnerabilities such as exclusion from inadequately developed business and informal 
networks that provide support and information. 
Section 6:  Conclusion and implications for policy 
Using data on firms in the manufacturing, retail, and service sectors from Kenya, this study shows 
that ownership of technologies such as computers, generators, and cell-phones increases when 
regulations, infrastructure, security, workforce, corruption, and finance pose significant burdens to every-
day operations in the business environment.  In particular, the probability of technology ownership is 0.07 24 
 
higher for all firms in the full sample, and 0.01 higher for firms in industries with low barriers to entry for 
women, if regulations are a binding constraint.  Such patterns are also true for female-owned firms which 
tend to be excluded from formal and informal network groups, and are often more credit-constrained than 
male-only owned firms in developing countries.  Estimates indicate that conditional on observables and 
the full set of industries, the probability of owning a computer, generator, or cell-phone is higher by 0.15 
if the firm is female-headed.  Interactions of the gender-of-owner indicator variable with different 
obstacle categories emphasize that differential patterns exist in the manner in which female-owned firms 
react to regulatory hurdles in Kenya.  In order to explain the somewhat greater reliance on technology by 
female-owned firms in the face of regulatory and infrastructural hurdles, we implement an Oaxaca-
Blinder type decomposition procedure which shows that up to 18% of the total observed gap in use of 
technology between firms with female owners and those without remains unexplained by differences in 
measurable characteristics.     
The results of this analysis provide some evidence that technology ownership is endogenous 
when regulations are restrictive and infrastructure is weak.  Firms rely on computers, generators, and cell-
phones to overcome the deficiencies posed by stringent restrictions on hours of operations as well as 
inadequate telecommunications infrastructure and unreliable power supply in order to conduct every-day 
activities.  The results of this study indicate that in addition to removing regulatory hurdles and improving 
physical infrastructure, firms may benefit from policies that enable greater technology ownership.  A way 
of implementing this would be to extend access to loans that are relatively low-cost for purposes of 
purchasing computers, generators, and cell-phones.  Since operation of computers, in particular, requires a 
basic level of skills, the provision of inexpensive vocational training and computer literacy courses would 
also be of value.  Finally, policies that build networks among female-owned businesses would help 
diffuse know-how on using technology to mitigate regulatory and infrastructural burdens in the business 
environment of Kenya.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of firms with female principal owners and without, by firm size 
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Figure 3:  Percentage of firms with female principal owners and without, by legal status 
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Table 1: Business environment in Kenya  
 Indicators  Kenya  Mean for 
      Sub-Saharan Africa 
Regulatory, Corruption, and Crime-related Indicators       
Days to obtain import license  25.92  19.23 
% of firms identifying tax rates as major constraint  58.22   37.99  
% of firms identifying tax administration as major constraint  32.00  26.20 
% of firms identifying business licensing and permits as   28.28  15.52 
major constraint 
    % of firms expected to pay informal payments to public  79.22  35.16 
officials (to get things done)       
% of firms expected to give gifts in order to get an operating  28.75  19.53 
license       
% of firms expected to give gifts in order to secure a   71.20  38.33 
government contract       
% of firms paying for security  74.61  60.45 
Losses due to theft, robbery, vandalism, and arson against the  3.87  1.68 
firm (% of sales)       
% of firms identifying crime, theft, and disorder as major  33.09  27.68 
constraint 
   
      Infrastructure-related Indicators       
Number of power outages in a typical month  6.90  10.30 
Value lost due to power outages (% of sales)  6.35  5.84 
Delay in obtaining an electrical connection (days)  40.50  31.94 
Delay in obtaining a water connection (days)  27.97  28.60 
Delay in obtaining a mainline telephone connection (days)  27.09  32.73 
      Finance and trade-related Indicators       
% of firms with line of credit or loans from financial  25.41  21.63 
institutions       
Value of collateral needed for a loan (% of loan amount)  120.81  142.60 
% of firms identifying access to finance as a major constraint  41.80  45.64 
% of firms that trade identifying customs and trade regulations  23.59  20.11 
as a major constraint       
Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Data for Kenya, 2007. 
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Table 2A: Unweighted numbers of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, or very severe 
      With female      No female 
   Total  principal owners  principal owners 
Obstacles related to 
      regulations  767  279  488 
infrastructure  670  242  428 
security  617  227  390 
workforce  150  57  93 
corruption  661  246  415 
finance  486  183  303 
Notes: There are 778 total firms in the sample of which 286 firms have female principal owners and 492 




Table 2B: Unweighted numbers of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, or very severe, by 
firm size 
   With female principal owners  No female principal owners 
   Micro  Small  Medium  Large  Micro  Small  Medium  Large 
Obstacles related to 
                regulations  49  123  68  39  75  181  140  92 
infrastructure  43  108  57  34  64  154  123  87 
security  38  94  61  34  52  124  127  87 
workforce  9  17  18  13  9  22  39  23 
corruption  39  112  61  34  57  157  121  80 
finance  37  93  39  14  68  129  73  33 
Notes: There are 778 total firms in the sample of which 124 are micro firms, 312 are small firms, 211 are 
medium firms, and 131 are large firms. 
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Table 2C: Unweighted numbers of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, or very severe, by industry 
   With female principal owners 
     
Information &  Construction &    Hotels &   
     Manufacturing  Retail  Technology  Transport  Restaurants  Other 
Obstacles related to 
            Regulations  161  65  7  9  25  12 
Infrastructure  144  56  7  6  21  8 
Security  140  49  6  8  16  8 
Workforce  43  9  0  0  5  0 
Corruption  142  56  8  8  20  12 
Finance  100  48  6  4  16  9 
 
 
   No female principal owners 
     
Information &  Construction &    Hotels &   
     Manufacturing  Retail  Technology  Transport  Restaurants  Other 
Obstacles related to 
            Regulations  289  88  15  15  42  39 
Infrastructure  266  74  13  13  36  26 
Security  253  58  9  13  34  23 
Workforce  70  10  1  3  7  2 
Corruption  246  67  13  15  40  34 
Finance  161  64  9  12  28  29 
Notes: There are 778 total firms in the sample of which 450 are in manufacturing firms, 161 are retail firms, 25 are Information and 
Technology firms, 24 are Construction and Transport firms, 67 are Hotels and Restaurant firms, and 51 are other firms. 33 
 
Table 2D: Unweighted numbers of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, or very severe, by use of technology 
 
   With female principal owners  No female principal owners 
 
Firm uses email  Firm uses cell-phone  Firm owns or  Firm uses email  Firm uses cell-phone  Firm owns or 
 
or its own website  for communication  shares a   or its own website  for communication  shares a  
 
or an internet  with clients and  generator  or an internet  with clients and  generator 
   connection  suppliers     connection  suppliers    
Obstacles related to 
            Regulations  129  49  77  257  74  176 
Infrastructure  112  43  70  232  63  170 
Security  116  38  73  231  52  165 
Workforce  26  9  28  66  9  48 
Corruption  110  39  71  221  56  153 
Finance  69  37  40  125  67  82 
Notes: There are 778 total firms in the sample of which 393 firms use email or own website or an internet connection, 123 firms use 
cell-phones for communication with clients and suppliers, and 253 firms own or share a generator.  34 
 
Table 3A: Weighted proportions of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, or very severe 
      With female      No female 
   Total  principal owners  principal owners 
Obstacles related to 
      regulations  0.999  0.997  1.000 
 
(0.0005)  (0.002)  (0.00001) 
infrastructure  0.868  0.898  0.852 
 
(0.014)  (0.066)  (0.019) 
Security  0.677  0.707  0.661 
 
(0.106)  (0.132)  (0.087) 
workforce  0.144  0.120  0.114 
 
(0.072)  (0.131)  (0.031) 
corruption  0.819  0.829  0.814 
 
(0.060)  (0.047)  (0.065) 
Finance  0.942  0.889  0.971 
   (0.021)  (0.067)  (0.007) 
Notes: There are 778 total firms in the sample of which 286 firms have female principal owners and 492 
have only male principal owners.  Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Enterprise 
Survey of Kenya.  Table reports percentage values. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 3B: Weighted proportions of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, or very severe, by 
firm size 
   With female principal owners  No female principal owners 
   Micro  Small  Medium  Large  Micro  Small  Medium  Large 
Obstacles related to 
                regulations  1.000  0.934  0.814  1.000  1.000  0.978  1.000  1.000 
 
(0.000)  (0.041)  (0.091)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
infrastructure  0.904  0.779  0.648  0.714  0.854  0.815  0.726  0.867 
 
(0.065)  (0.053)  (0.087)  (0.068)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.066)  (0.037) 
Security  0.706  0.685  0.823  0.715  0.659  0.657  0.831  0.829 
 
(0.136)  (0.103)  (0.038)  (0.144)  (0.089)  (0.077)  (0.088)  (0.048) 
workforce  0.202  0.142  0.072  0.119  0.113  0.113  0.168  0.287 
 
(0.135)  (0.042)  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.037)  (0.050) 
corruption  0.829  0.839  0.824  0.763  0.813  0.846  0.882  0.858 
 
(0.048)  (0.055)  (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.067)  (0.031)  (0.017)  (0.010) 
Finance  0.898  0.714  0.486  0.219  0.981  0.690  0.530  0.335 
   (0.065)  (0.023)  (0.046)  (0.123)  (0.006)  (0.030)  (0.067)  (0.055) 
Notes: There are 778 total firms in the sample of which 124 are micro firms, 312 are small firms, 211 are 
medium firms, and 131 are large firms. Weighted to national level with weights provided by the 
Enterprise Survey of Kenya.  Table reports percentage values. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 35 
 
Table 3C: Weighted proportions of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, or very severe, by industry 
   With female principal owners 
       
Construction &    Hotels &   
     Manufacturing  Retail  IT  Transport  Restaurants  Other 
Obstacles related to 
          regulations  1.000  0.996  0.667  1.000  1.000  1.000 
 
(0.000)  (0.003)  (0.088)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
infrastructure  0.984  0.926  0.667  0.976  0.994  0.349 
 
(0.019)  (0.052)  (0.088)  (0.025)  (0.005)  (0.014) 
security  0.820  0.640  0.721  0.995  0.714  0.669 
 
(0.071)  (0.119)  (0.061)  (0.008)  (0.259)  (0.006) 
workforce  0.020  0.334  -  -  0.193  - 
 
(0.016)  (0.187) 
   
(0.130) 
  corruption  0.806  0.928  0.834  0.992  0.536  1.000 
 
(0.068)  (0.052)  (0.044)  (0.013)  (0.126)  (0.000) 
finance  0.786  0.923  0.617  0.967  0.987  0.666 










Table 3C (continued): Weighted proportions of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, or very severe, by industry  
   No female principal owners 
       
Construction &    Hotels &  
     Manufacturing  Retail  IT  Transport  Restaurants  Other 
Obstacles related to 
          regulations  1.000  0.999  0.996  1.000  1.000  1.000 
 
(0.000)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
infrastructure  0.856  0.991  0.973  0.674  0.972  0.658 
 
(0.052)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.052) 
security  0.615  0.645  0.940  0.995  0.967  0.605 
 
(0.110)  (0.095)  (0.034)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.134) 
workforce  0.131  0.078  0.005  0.328  0.039  0.104 
 
(0.037)  (0.074)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.038)  (0.133) 
corruption  0.821  0.774  0.981  1.000  0.993  0.766 
 
(0.046)  (0.134)  (0.024)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.080) 
finance  0.989  0.988  0.944  0.989  0.937  0.916 
   (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.006)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
Notes: There are 778 total firms in the sample of which 450 are in manufacturing firms, 161 are retail firms, 25 are Information and 
Technology firms, 24 are Construction and Transport firms, 67 are Hotels and Restaurant firms, and 51 are other firms.  Weighted to 
national level with weights provided by the Enterprise Survey of Kenya.  Table reports percentage values. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 3D: Weighted proportion of firms characterizing obstacles as moderate, major, or very severe, by use of technology 
   With female principal owners  No female principal owners 
 
Firm uses email  Firm uses cell-phone  Firm owns or  Firm uses email  Firm uses cell-phone  Firm owns or 
 
or its own website  for communication  shares a   or its own website  for communication  shares a  
 
or an internet  with clients and  generator  or an internet  with clients and  generator 
   connection  suppliers     connection  suppliers    
Obstacles related to 
          regulations  0.960  1.000  1.000  0.997  1.000  1.000 
 
(0.011)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.0003)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
infrastructure  0.892  0.904  0.968  0.688  0.851  0.977 
 
(0.024)  (0.065)  (0.037)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
security  0.944  0.706  0.981  0.946  0.670  0.966 
 
(0.013)  (0.136)  (0.022)  (0.036)  (0.086)  (0.023) 
workforce  0.031  0.202  0.232  0.301  0.115  0.253 
 
(0.022)  (0.135)  (0.072)  (0.018)  (0.032)  (0.060) 
corruption  0.867  0.829  0.975  0.952  0.810  0.934 
 
(0.094)  (0.048)  (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.069)  (0.040) 
finance  0.145  0.898  0.610  0.888  0.980  0.607 
   (0.033)  (0.065)  (0.057)  (0.069)  (0.006)  (0.126) 
Notes: There are 778 total firms in the sample of which 393 firms use email or own website or an internet connection, 123 firms use cell-
phones for communication with clients and suppliers, and 253 firms own or share a generator.  Weighted to national level with weights 





Table 4: Descriptive statistics disaggregated by gender of principal owner 
   Firm has at least   Firm has no   Difference  
   one female   female   (column 1 - 
   principal owner  principal owner  column 2) 
Endogenous variable    
 
  
Firm owns a computer,  0.985  0.968  0.017 
generator, or cell-phone  (0.003)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Obstacles related to    
 
  
regulations  0.998  0.999  -0.001 
   (0.001)  (0.0002)  (0.001) 
infrastructure  0.923  0.839  0.084** 
   (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.034) 
security  0.708  0.660  0.048 
   (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.051) 
workforce  0.161  0.134  0.027 
   (0.035)  (0.024)  (0.043) 
corruption  0.791  0.834  -0.043 
   (0.031)  (0.019)  (0.037) 
finance  0.943  0.941  0.001 
   (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.021) 
Objective measures of obstacles    
 
  
Firm paid for security (equipment,  0.754  0.642  0.112 
personnel, or security services  (0.057)  (0.042)  (0.071) 
Firm made protection payments (to  0.169  0.043  0.126** 
organized crime to prevent violence)  (0.056)  (0.020)  (0.060) 
Firm made informal payments to the  0.199  0.213  -0.014 
police when transporting goods  (0.051)  (0.036)  (0.062) 
Average percent of working capital financed  29.965  25.998  3.967 
from formal sources (banks, on credit)  (2.905)  (1.981)  (3.516) 
Average percent of working capital financed  2.955  2.180  0.774 
from informal sources (family, moneylenders)  (1.176)  (0.733)  (1.386) 
Regional indicators    
 
  
Nairobi  0.564  0.763  -0.199* 
   (0.092)  (0.059)  (0.109) 
Mombasa  0.409  0.221  0.187* 
   (0.092)  (0.059)  (0.110) 
Nakuru  0.015  0.007  0.008* 
   (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Kisumu  0.012  0.008  0.004 
   (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics disaggregated by gender of principal owner (continued) 
   Firm has at least   Firm has no   Difference  
   one female   female   (column 1 - 
   principal owner  principal owner  column 2) 
Firm and industry characteristics    
 
  
Natural log of number of years firm has been  1.731  1.676  0.056 
operating as of 2007  (0.156)  (0.121)  (0.198) 
Natural log of value of machinery (machinery,  5.891  7.065  -1.173 
vehicle equipment new and/or used)  (0.887)  (0.572)  (1.056) 
Natural log of value of property (land and  0.016  1.147  -1.131*** 
buildings)  (0.006)  (0.398)  (0.398) 
Natural log of total number of full-time  0.555  0.505  0.049 
employees  (0.095)  (0.070)  (0.118) 
Natural log of total number of temporary  0.035  0.036  -0.001 
employees  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
Firm’s industrial classification -       0.004  0.018  -0.014 
manufacturing: food  (0.002)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Firm’s industrial classification -       0.105  0.055  0.051 
manufacturing: garment  (0.056)  (0.031)  (0.064) 
Firm’s industrial classification -       0.071  0.311  -0.240*** 
manufacturing: other  (0.042)  (0.060)  (0.073) 
Firm’s industrial classification - retail      0.461  0.299  0.162 
   (0.091)  (0.060)  (0.109) 
Firm’s industrial classification -       0.359  0.318  0.042 
rest of the universe  (0.088)  (0.060)  (0.106) 
Percent of firm owned by largest shareholders  95.990  95.888  0.103 
   (1.916)  (1.556)  (2.468) 
Legal status of establishment: public     0.001  0.0002  0.0004 
   (0.001)  (0.0002)  (0.001) 
Legal status of establishment: private       0.013  0.010  0.003 
   (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Legal status of establishment: sole      0.910  0.896  0.015 
proprietorship  (0.042)  (0.037)  (0.056) 
Legal status of establishment:      0.076  0.094  -0.018 
partnership  (0.042)  (0.037)  (0.056) 
Legal status of establishment: other     0.0001  -  0.0001 
   (0.0001)  -  (0.0001) 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics disaggregated by gender of principal owner (continued) 
   Firm has at least   Firm has no   Difference  
   one female   female   (column 1 - 
   principal owner  principal owner  column 2) 
Firm and industry characteristics 
      Firm has 100 full-time paid employees or  0.003  0.002  0.001 
more  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Firm has 20-99 full-time paid employees  0.008  0.007  0.001 
   (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Firm has 5-19 full-time paid employees  0.019  0.018  0.001 
   (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Firm has fewer than 5 full-time paid employees  0.970  0.973  -0.003 
   (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Firm has African-origin principal owner  0.962  0.993  -0.031 
   (0.030)  (0.001)  (0.030) 
Firm has Indian-origin principal owner  0.008  0.006  0.002 
   (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Firm has Lebanese/Middle Eastern or other  0.002  0.003  -0.0004 
Asian or European origin principal owner  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Top manager's characteristics    
 
  
Years of managerial experience in this sector  7.617  8.016  -0.400 
   (0.976)  (0.829)  (1.281) 
Has MBA or PHD from Kenya or another  0.006  0.003  0.003 
country  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Enterprise Survey for Kenya.  Table 
reports percentage values.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10.     
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Table 5A: Marginal effects for technology ownership for all industries 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Obstacles related to 
        regulations  0.187***  0.189***  0.374***  0.065*** 
   (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.065)  (0.041) 
infrastructure  -0.050**  -0.052**  -0.059***  -0.020*** 
   (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.007) 
security  0.003  -0.001  -0.010  -0.006 
   (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.010) 
workforce  0.054***  0.043***  0.037***  0.009 
   (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.011) 
corruption  -0.020  -0.011  0.017  -0.002 
   (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.012) 
finance  0.075***  0.073***  0.052***  0.009 
   (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.005) 
Establishment has one or more female     0.017*  0.818***  0.150*** 
principal owners     (0.007)  (0.055)  (0.169) 
Female principal owner interactions with obstacles related to    
   
  
regulations    
 
-0.344***  -0.041** 
     
 
(0.080)  (0.040) 
infrastructure    
 
0.075**  0.022*** 
     
 
(0.044)  (0.009) 
security    
 
0.034*  0.004 
     
 
(0.018)  (0.006) 
workforce    
 
-0.012  -0.008 
     
 
(0.026)  (0.009) 
corruption    
 
-0.099***  -0.021 
     
 
(0.028)  (0.010) 
finance    
 
0.032  -0.001 
     
 
(0.017)  (0.006) 
2   value of joint test of significance of female principal    
 
155.670  22.200 
owner interaction terms    
 
[0.000]  [0.000] 
Includes regional indicators  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Includes firm, industry, and top manager characteristics  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Enterprise Survey for Kenya.  Table reports 
marginal effects from probit regressions.  Robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. p-values in 
square brackets.  The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10.  Firm and industry characteristics include firm’s 
age, indicators for large or medium firm, value of machinery and property, log of the number of permanent and 
temporary workers, whether any of the principal owners are of Indian origin, African origin, or Asian or European 
origin, indicators for three categories of manufacturing firms, retail firm, and “rest of the universe” firm, percentage 
of the firm held by the largest shareholders, and indicators for whether firm is public, private, sole proprietorship, 
partnership, or other.  Top manager characteristics include whether she/he holds an MBA or Ph.D. and years of 
managerial experience working in this sector. Regressions have 778 firm level observations. 42 
 
Table 5B: Marginal effects for technology ownership for industries where barriers to entry are relatively 
low for women-owned firms 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Obstacles related to 
        regulations  0.200***  0.194***  0.229***  0.005*** 
   (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.115)  (0.002) 
infrastructure  -0.0001  -0.001  -0.017***  -0.001*** 
   (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.0004) 
security  0.017  0.015  0.008  0.001*** 
   (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.001) 
workforce  0.021*  0.021*  0.021  -0.0001 
   (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.0003) 
corruption  -0.059***  -0.056**  -0.045**  -0.002** 
   (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.001) 
finance  0.072***  0.070***  0.072***  0.001 
   (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.001) 
Establishment has one or more female 
 
0.003***  0.413**  -0.0004 
principal owners 
 
(0.001)  (0.460)  (0.001) 
Female principal owner interactions with obstacles related to 
        regulations 
   
-0.096  -0.0001 
  
   
(0.112)  (0.001) 
infrastructure 
   
0.034**  0.001*** 
  
   
(0.028)  (0.0003) 
security 
   
0.026  -0.0004 
  
   
(0.021)  (0.0005) 
workforce 
   
-0.003  -0.0003 
  
   
(0.017)  (0.001) 
corruption 
   
-0.022  0.0001 
  
   
(0.015)  (0.0004) 
finance 
   
-0.020  -0.0003 
  
   
(0.023)  (0.001) 
2   value of joint test of significance of female principal 
   
8.020  0.650 
owner interaction terms 
   
[0.046]  [0.886] 
Includes regional indicators  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Includes firm, industry, and top manager characteristics  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Enterprise Survey for Kenya.  Table reports 
marginal effects from probit regressions.  Robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses.  p-values in 
square brackets.  The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10.  Firm and industry characteristics and top 
manager’s characteristics are the same as those in Table 5A.  Regressions have 502 firm level observations in 
industries that include garments, retail, food, textiles, non-metallic minerals, hotels & restaurants, construction & 
transport. 
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Table 5C: Marginal effects for technology ownership with objective measures of obstacles for all 
industries 
Objective Measures of Obstacles  (1)  (2) 
Establishment made protection payments (to organized  -0.024  0.003 
crime to prevent violence)  (0.140)  (0.002) 
Establishment paid for security (equipment, personnel,   -0.152**  -0.007*** 
or security services)  (0.066)  (0.0003) 
Establishment made informal payments to the police  0.213**    
when transporting goods  (0.075)    
Average percent of working capital financed from  0.007*  0.0001* 
formal sources (banks, on credit)  (0.004)  (0.00004) 
Average percent of working capital financed from  -0.008*  0.0002*** 
informal sources (family, moneylenders)  (0.004)  (0.00005) 
Establishment has one or more female principal  -0.019  0.005*** 
owners  (0.095)  (0.001) 
Female principal owner interactions with:       
Establishment made protection payments (to organized  0.050  0.003 
crime to prevent violence)  (0.132)  (0.001) 
Establishment paid for security (equipment, personnel,   0.293  0.001 
or security services)  (0.190)  (0.001) 
Establishment made informal payments to the police  -0.135    
when transporting goods  (0.197)    
Average percent of working capital financed from   -0.007*  -0.0001*** 
formal sources (banks, on credit)  (0.003)  (0.00002) 
Average percent of working capital financed from  0.017**  -0.0003*** 
informal sources (family, moneylenders)  (0.007)  (0.00005) 
χ
2  value of joint test of significance of female   11.66   39.29  
principal owner interaction terms   [0.009]   [0.000] 
Includes regional indicators  YES  YES 
Includes firm, industry, and top manager characteristics  YES  YES 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Enterprise Survey for Kenya.  Table reports 
marginal effects from probit regressions.  Robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. p-values in 
square brackets.  The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10.  Firm and industry characteristics include firm’s 
age, indicators for large or medium firm, value of machinery and property, log of the number of permanent and 
temporary workers, whether any of the principal owners are of Indian origin, African origin, or Asian or European 
origin, indicators for three categories of manufacturing firms, retail firm, and “rest of the universe” firm, percentage 
of the firm held by the largest shareholders, and indicators for whether firm is public, private, sole proprietorship, 
partnership, or other.  Top manager characteristics include whether she/he holds an MBA or Ph.D. from Kenya or 
abroad and years of managerial experience working in this sector. Column (1) had 503 firm level observations and 
column (2) has 776 firm level observations. 44 
 
Table 5D: Marginal effects for technology ownership with objective measures of obstacles for industries 
where barriers to entry are relatively low for women-owned firms 
Objective Measures of Obstacles  (1)  (2) 
Establishment made protection payments (to organized  -0.607***  -0.0003 
crime to prevent violence)  (0.096)  (0.0004) 
Establishment paid for security (equipment, personnel,   -0.342  -0.0001*** 
or security services)  (0.220)  (0.0001) 
Establishment made informal payments to the police  0.124** 
  when transporting goods  (0.054) 
  Average percent of working capital financed from  0.001  -0.000001 
formal sources (banks, on credit)  (0.005)  (0.000001) 
Average percent of working capital financed from  -0.022***  -0.000001 
informal sources (family, moneylenders)  (0.006)  (0.000001) 
Establishment has one or more female principal  -0.184  0.000001 
owners  (0.148)  (0.00002) 
Female principal owner interactions with: 
    Establishment made protection payments (to organized  -0.185  0.00002*** 
crime to prevent violence)  (0.140)  (0.00003) 
Establishment paid for security (equipment, personnel,   0.308  0.00002* 
or security services)  (0.385)  (0.00003) 
Establishment made informal payments to the police  0.470*** 
  when transporting goods  (0.085) 
  Average percent of working capital financed from   -0.008  -0.00000002 
formal sources (banks, on credit)  (0.005)  (0.000001) 
Average percent of working capital financed from  0.0002  0.000001 
informal sources (family, moneylenders)  (0.005)  (0.000001) 
χ
2  value of joint test of significance of female   379.470  10.360 
principal owner interaction terms  [0.000]  [0.016] 
Includes regional indicators  YES  YES 
Includes firm, industry, and top manager characteristics  YES  YES 
Notes: Weighted to national level with weights provided by the Enterprise Survey for Kenya.  Table reports 
marginal effects from probit regressions.  Robust standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses. p-values in 
square brackets.  The notation 
*** is p<0.01, 
** is p<0.05, 
* is p<0.10.  Firm and industry characteristics and top 
manager’s characteristics are the same as those in Table 5C.  Regressions have 502 firm level observations in 





Table 6A: Average predicted probabilities using female firm and male firm sample data and female firm and male firm coefficients 
   All Industries  Industries with Low Barriers to Entry for Women 
   Firms with female owners  Firms without female owners  Firms with female owners  Firms without female owners 
   βf  βm  βf  βm  βf  βm  βf  βm 
  
       
  
   
  
Technology  0.985  0.967  0.986  0.970  0.983  0.982  0.976  0.973 
Notes: Industries with low barriers to entry include garment, retail, food, textiles, non-metallic minerals, hotels & restaurants, and 
construction and transport.  All industries includes a sample size of 778 firms of which 286 have female principal owners and 492 
have only male principal owners.  Industries with low barriers to entry includes a sample size of 502 firms of which 215 have female 
principal owners and 287 have only male principal owners. 
 
Table 6B: Decomposition of average predicted probabilities using an Oaxaca-Blinder type method 
  
   All Industries  Industries with Low Barriers to Entry for Women 
 
Total observed   Explained  Residual  (Residual gap/   Total observed   Explained  Residual  (Residual gap/  
   Gap  Gap  Gap  Total observed gap)  Gap  Gap  Gap  Total observed gap) 
                  Technology  -0.015  0.004  -0.018  1.243  -0.010  -0.008  -0.002  0.176 
Notes:  Reports results of the decomposition when male firm coefficients are used as weights.  Results with female firm coefficients are 
comparable.  Industries with low barriers to entry include garment, retail, food, textiles, non-metallic minerals, hotels & restaurants, 
and construction and transport.  All industries includes a sample size of 778 firms of which 286 have female principal owners and 492 
have only male principal owners.  Industries with low barriers to entry includes a sample size of 502 firms of which 215 have female 
principal owners and 287 have only male principal owners.46 
 
 
                                                       
1 A pair-wise weighted correlation matrix of the 6 obstacles studied here (regulations, infrastructure, security, 
workforce, corruption, finance) indicates that the majority are significantly correlated - even things as distinct as 
infrastructure and workforce, and infrastructure and finance.   
2 Note that these data cannot address entry into entrepreneurship as it includes a random sample of firms that are 
already in existence.   
3 The majority of businesses in Kenya are Small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  These are often rural-based and 
owner-owned and managed, flexible, with low labor costs and low costs of raw materials.  In recent times, 
technology intensive SMEs have arisen, particularly in the technology intensive industries.   Given their specific 
nature, SMEs in Kenya have noted advantages including the ability to generate employment, high level of 
productivity, and the means to rapidly absorb new technical innovations (Atieno, 2009). 
4 This is similar to the methodology in Amin (2009).   
5 For purposes of this study, we consider the ownership of computers, generators, and cell-phones combined.  We 
can study effects separately for computers alone, but there is relatively little variation in generator and cell-phone 
ownership for us to examine separate effects for these two technologies, and whether the effects diverge by gender 
of the firm’s owner.    
6 Results using female coefficients as weights are comparable.  Furthermore, the decomposition was performed with 
and without the constant term.  Results with and without the constant term were close to the sixth decimal place, 
mainly because we condition on a large set of regional, firm, industry, and top manager characteristics.  Given the 
appreciable lack of difference in estimates, we report results for the models that include the constant term.  